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Abstract
In this paper we expanded the security of a central broadcast protocol using thermal states to
the case in which the eavesdropper controls the source. Quantum secrecy in a continuous variable
central broadcast scheme is guaranteed by the quantum correlations present in thermal states
arising from the Hanbury Brown and Twiss effect. This work allows for a method of key exchange
in which two parties can agree a key as long as both can detect the same source and they are within
the spatial coherence length of the source. This is important because it allows quantum secure key
exchange with only minimal changes to existing infrastructure.
∗b.varcoe@leeds.ac.uk
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Expanding Quantum Key Distribution outside of the normal paradigm of single photons
sent from Alice to Bob is a current challenge that is particularly relevant to traditional
networks where upgrading to single photons optical fibers is impractical. In a series of
papers [1, 2], we have been developping a model for thermal states key distribution that is
especially relevant to this challenge because it would allow QKD in a microwave network.
In these papers we demonstrate that, rather than being a source of ‘noise’[3], thermal states
are a source of discord that can be used as a resource for quantum computing[4].
In particular the model that we consider is a central broadcast [5] model rather than a
point-to-point model [6]. In central broadcasting, a single source transmits a signal to several
receivers, which allows the receivers to detect Hanbury Brown and Twiss noise correlations.
A common example of a central broadcast channel is that of a satellite beaming in free-space
to several receiving antennas and the information received depends on the channel noise and
the reliability of the detectors.
This set-up is easy to implement in the laboratory, using the Hanbury Brown and Twiss
(HBT) interferometer [7, 8]. A source shines onto a beamsplitter, which divides the signal
into two beams, one detected by Alice, the other by Bob. When the radiation is thermal, the
signal is composed of bunched pairs. The action of the beamsplitter is to split the pairs, to
exploit the correlations within. This is known as the Hanbury Brown and Twiss effect, and
the correlations are known to exhibit discord [9], which is a necessary condition for QKD
[4].
Therefore, far from being dismissable as mere noise [3], the discord present in thermal
photons serves as a resource in QKD. In ref. [1, 2] we have described a central broadcast
scheme (CBS) where a source (controlled by Alice) emits a signal which is divided and shared
between the two legal parties. There are two channels open to the eavesdropper in such a
protocol, the lower channel between the beamsplitter and Bob, and the higher channel
between the source and the beamsplitter. In [1], we let Eve access the lower channel; in
[2], we gave her access to the higher channel. In both cases, the secrecy arises from the
correlations present in the bunched pairs.
Only one step remains to fully establish our CBS as a valid quantum key distribution,
and that is the requirement of trust in the source. The security of the source is generally
considered paramount to quantum key distribution protocols. Eavesdropping is allowed on
the way from source to the legal parties, but the source cannot be untrusted.
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In a CBS, the source can be either under (for instance) Alice’s control, or out of either
legal parties’ control. So far, we have considered that it was under Alice’s control. This
has allowed us to make the assumption that the radiation transmitted to Alice and Bob
is thermal. Technically, no such assumption can be made if the source is out of Alice’s or
Bob’s control. It is natural to wonder then, if the protocol remains secure in this case.
Let us recall the protocol briefly, as illustrated on Figure 1. A source produces states
which are sent onto a beamsplitter ηab, which splits it into one part which goes to Alice and
one part that goes to Bob. Alice and Bob measures their signal separately. They perform a
g(2)(0) > 1 check on their data, to ensure its thermality and therefore ascertain the presence
of correlations. Once the presence of correlations is confirmed, they proceed as per usual,
with reconciliation and privacy amplification.
The g(2)(0)-check is the pivot here, because it is when Alice and Bob verify that the signal
they have detected is indeed, correlated. If it is not, they must begin anew. This limits the
eavesdropper in her actions, and forces her to emit a thermal signal. If she wants to beat the
g(2)(0)-check and retain some information about the signal which Alice and Bob will detect,
Eve must create a signal which will correlate her to both. Thankfully, the likelyhood of this
is very remote for three reasons, firstly because three-way correlations, where the bunched
radiation is not a pair but a triplet, is a statistically rare occurence. Secondly, Eve would
face the time limitation introduced by the coherence length of the radiation. Simply put,
Eve must somehow find herself in a physical position where she can force the satellite to
produce a sufficient number of triplets for her to be correlated to Alice and to Bob, and as
well, detect her share of the signal within the coherence time. Lastly, the splitting at the
beamsplitter is stochastic and therefore Eve cannot predict it.
This is not without caveats for Alice and Bob. Since they can have no trust in the source,
they must now reconcile against her, at the cost of a lower key rates. We are considering
here, a retrofit to a broadcast channel. Our aim is to build trust in existing infrastructures,
where the origin of the data is uncertain, by establishing that it can be used to distribute a
quantum secure secret key, on the condition that the g(2)(0) requirement is satisfied.
In the following, we model the eavesdropping and establish the security of the protocol
for correlated and un-correlated noise.
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FIG. 1: In this situation, a satellite beams down a signal, which is received by Alice and
Bob. We assume that Eve has control of the satellite, and so beams up the signal she
wants transmitted to Alice and Bob.
FIG. 2: Schematics of the set-up. A thermal source shines onto a beamsplitter ηab which
splits the signal into a part going to Alice and the other going to Bob. We assume that
Eve has control of the source. The EPR is split into one mode which is the source signal
for Alice and Bob, the other remains Eve’s.
I. FORMAL DESCRIPTION
To build our model, we follow Figure 2 and consider that Eve is sending one mode of
an EPR state down. This is the equivalent of a prepare-and-send scheme, but instantly it
puts Eve at a disadvantage since upon her measurement of her mode, the mode sent to the
legal parties is modelled by a thermal state [10]. That mode falls onto a beamsplitter with
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transmittance ηab, which divides it between Alice and Bob. Eve’s input state is
ΓEPR =
 νI2 √ν2 − 1Z2√
ν2 − 1Z2 νI2
 ,
where I2 is the 2× 2 identity matrix and Z2 =
 1 0
0 −1
.
We assume a vacuum at the other input of the beamsplitter. The outcome is (with
ζ =
√
ν2 − 1 and µab =
√
1− ηab for clarity)
Γ =

ν 0
√
ηabζ 0 −µabζ 0
0 ν 0 −√ηabζ 0 µabζ
√
ηabζ 0 ηabν + µ
2
ab 0 µab
√
ηab(1− ν) 0
0 −√ηabζ 0 ηabν + µ2ab 0 µab
√
ηab(1− ν)
−µabζ 0 µab√ηab(1− ν) 0 µ2abν + ηab 0
0 µabζ 0 µab
√
ηab(1− ν) 0 µ2abν + ηab

.
We identify the blocks as
Γ =

γe γeb γea
γeb γb γab
γea γab γa
 .
As we mentioned before, since the eavesdropper controls the source, the secrecy is determined
by the information the legal parties share independently of the source, I(A : B|S), which is
defined as
I(A : B|S) = H(a, s) +H(b, s)−H(s)−H(a, b, s) .
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To calculate H(a, s), H(b, s), H(s) and H(a, b, s), we need
Γas =
 γe γea
γea γa

Γbs =
 γe γeb
γeb γb

Γs =γe
Γabs =

γe γeb γea
γeb γe γab
γea γab γa

respectively. Then [11, 12],
I(A : B|S) = 1
2
log(2pie)2 det(Γas)+
1
2
log(2pie)2 det(Γbs)−1
2
log(2pie) det(Γs)−1
2
log(2pie)3 det(Γabs) .
Alice and Bob expect correlations in their respective signals. These correlations are
quantified using the quantum discord, defined explicitly as
D(B|A) = S(Γa)− S(Γab) + min
Γ0
S(Γb|xA)
where Γb|xA is the covariance matrix of B conditioned by a homodyne measurement on A
[10]
Γb|xA = Γb − Γab(XΓaX)−1ΓTab ,
with X =
 1 0
0 0
 and ()−1 the pseudo-inverse. The Von Neumann entropy is given by
S(x) =
N∑
i=1
(
xi + 1
2
)
log
(
xi + 1
2
)
−
(
xi − 1
2
)
log
(
xi − 1
2
)
where xi are the symplectic eigenvalues of Γ.
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II. INFLUENCE OF CORRELATED NOISE IN EVE’S CHANNEL
A. Coherent state
Ve = 1SNU (Shot Noise Unit) represents a vacuum state, which is the minimum
uncertainty state, centred at the origin. Because a coherent state is a displaced vacuum
state, its variance is also Ve = 1SNU . We have established before in [1, 2] that there are
no correlations, nor information in a coherent state when it is shared by central broadcast.
Figure 3 confirms this.
FIG. 3: We plot the discord (red) and conditional mutual information (blue) against ηab
for Ve = 1SNU .
It would be incorrect to assume that this is a general model for a system running on empty
as it were. We consider here loss-less and noise-less channels between Eve and ηab, as well
as between ηab and Alice and Bob. Therefore, we can establish the amount of correlations
which Alice and Bob can expect, should they share a coherent state. For this reason, we
have also elected to plot not only I(A : B|S) but also I(A : B); this shows that there is no
mutual information between Alice and Bob for them to reconcile against the source. This is
confirmed by the nullity of the discord, which demonstrates that there are no correlations.
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B. Thermal state
Eve inputs a state Ve = ν + 1, where ν is the variance of the thermal state she sends
through the satellite.
FIG. 4: We plot the discord (red) and conditional mutual information (blue) against ηab
for Ve = 2SNU .
This situation from Eve’s point of view, should be ideal. The state she is sending is a
thermal state of variance 1SNU, the rest being made up of shot noise. This shot noise does
not contain any correlation, as we have seen on Figure 3. Yet, it brings fluctuations in the
signal, so the potential for photon pairs. This is enough to provide Alice and Bob with
discord and information they can share independently of her, as we see on Figure 4. This
means that as soon as the eavesdropper sends a state to the legal parties, she has given them
enough information that they can build a quantum secure secret key.
Figure 5 illustrates how thermal preparation noise influences I(A : B|S) and D(B|A).
As we would naturally expect, Alice and Bob’s situation is much helped by Eve’s high
preparation noise. Indeed, the higher Eve’s noise at preparation, the more photon pairs
arrive at ηab and become available to Alice and Bob to build a key from.
It would then be easy to conclude that a high thermal input onto ηab helps Alice and Bob,
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FIG. 5: We plot the discord (red) and conditional mutual information (blue) against ηab
for Ve = 1040SNU . This value is consistent with an input at microwave frequencies.
although this would perhaps be hasty. A thermal input onto ηab can happen in essentially
two ways: Eve’s preparation noise is thermal (Figure 5), or the channel between Eve and ηab
introduces the noise. Commonly, the thermal channel is modelled as a beamsplitter where
the “free” input receives a thermal state [10, 13].
C. Thermal channel
To model a thermal channel, let us add a beamsplitter of transmittance ηth between the
source and ηab. At one input, we feed Ve and at the other, a thermal state of variance Vth.
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The input covariance matrix to ηab is then Γ
⊕
I2 where
Γ =

ν 0
√
ηthζ 0 −µthζ 0
0 ν 0 −√ηthζ 0 µthζ
√
ηthζ 0 ηthν + µ
2
thVth 0 µth
√
ηth(Vth − ν) 0
0 −√ηthζ 0 ηthν + µ2thVth 0 µth
√
ηth(Vth − ν)
−µthζ 0 µth√ηth(Vth − ν) 0 µ2thν + ηthVth 0
0 µthζ 0 µth
√
ηth(Vth − ν) 0 µ2thν + ηthVth

.
The output matrix becomes
Γout =

γe γev γeb γea
γev γv γbv γav
γeb γbv γb γab
γea γav γab γa
 ,
with
γe =
 ν 0
0 ν

γv =
 V vx 0
0 V vp
 with V vx = µ2thν + ηthVth and V vp = µ2thν + ηthVth
γa =
 µ2abV abx + ηab 0
0 µ2abV
ab
p + ηab
 with V abx = ηthν + µ2thVth and V abp = ηthν + µ2thVth
γb =
 ηabV abx + µ2ab 0
0 ηabV
ab
p + µ
2
ab

γev =
 −µthζ 0
0 µthζ

γeb =
√ηab√ηthζ 0
0 −√ηab√ηthζ

γea =
 −µab√ηthζ 0
0 µab
√
ηthζ

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γbv =
 √ηabV abvx 0
0
√
ηabV
abv
p
 with V abvx = µth√ηth(Vth − ν) and V abvp = µth√ηth(Vth − ν)
γav =
 −µabV abvx 0
0 −µabV abvp

γab =
 µab√ηab(1− V abx ) 0
0 µab
√
ηab(1− V abp )

We can see the effect of an increasing thermal noise input on Figure 6. When ηth = 0,
the state which is transmitted is Vth. As a result, when the thermal noise is very high, eg.
Vth = 500SNU, I(A : B|S) and D(B|A) are high as ηth → 0, since a large thermal state has
many photon pairs to contribute to the secrecy [2]. As ηth increases, Eve’s contribution to
the signal increases. As ηth approaches unity, I(A : B|S) and D(B|A) are determined by
the correlations present in Eve’s signal.
The case Vth = 1SNU shows us the effect of loss in the channel. ηth → 0 models high loss
and therefore, I(A : B|S) and D(B|A) are minimal at that point. This merely indicates
that most of the signal is lost on the way from the satellite. This makes the input into ηab
essentially shot noise, which we have already seen, by itself has no secrecy potential.
As Vth increase, I(A : B|S) and D(B|A) increase as well. This reflects what we saw on
Figure 5; a higher thermal input means more photon pairs so more available information.
Naturally, all plots converge to the same value when ηth = 1, since that reflects a noiseless
channel. At that point, only the source signal provides correlations.
III. INFLUENCE OF ALICE’S AND BOB’S CHANNEL NOISE
It may well seem like noise is a good thing, however, the noise considered in the previous
section is noise in Eve’s channel, before ηab. Our results so far exclude channel noise in either
Alice’s or Bob’s channels. We now include a thermal channel between ηab and Alice, and
one between ηab and Bob, in the same way as we did between the source and ηab, by means
of beamsplitters ηtha and ηthb with secondary thermal inputs Vα and Vβ.
11
FIG. 6: Conditional mutual information and discord for several values of a thermal input
at ηth. Eve’s input is Ve = 2SNU and Alice and Bob get an equal share of the signal,
ηab = 0.5.
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The now-gigantic covariance matrix becomes
Γ =

γe γev γeb γea γeva γevb
γev γv γbv γav γvva γvvb
γeb γbv γb γab γbva γbvb
γea γav γab γa γava γavb
γeva γvva γbva γava γva γvavb
γevb γvvb γbvb γa γvavb γvb

,
with relevant sub-matrices
γe =
 ν 0
0 ν

γa =
 ηtha(µ2abV abx + ηab) + µthaV xα 0
0 ηtha(µ
2
abV
ab
p + ηab) + µthaV
p
α

γb =
 ηthb(ηabV abx + µ2ab) + µthbV xβ 0
0 ηthb(ηabV
ab
p + µ
2
ab) + µthbV
p
β

γeb =
√ηthb√ηab√ηthζ 0
0 −√ηthb
√
ηab
√
ηthζ

γea =
 −√ηthaµab√ηthζ 0
0
√
ηthaµab
√
ηthζ

γab =
 √ηtha√ηthbµab√ηab(1− V abx ) 0
0
√
ηtha
√
ηthbµab
√
ηab(1− V abp )

Figures 7 and 8 allow us to see the influence the thermal noise in Alice’s and Bob’s
channels has on the conditional mutual information and on the discord.
At first glance, this seems to contradict our earlier propos, namely, that noise is our
friend. Indeed, we can see straight away that when Alice’s and Bob’s channels are noiseless
and Ve = 2SNU (red plot), the conditional mutual information and the discord are highest.
This highlights that thermal noise in Alice’s and Bob’s channels are deleterious to secrecy.
That is fair enough; after all, this particular noise is uncorrelated and so genuinely pollutes
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FIG. 7: We compare the influence of various noises on the conditional mutual information.
The parameters are as follows. Blue: Ve = 1SNU , Vα = Vβ = 1SNU . Red: Ve = 2SNU ,
Vα = Vβ = 1SNU . Yellow: Ve = 1SNU Vα = Vβ = 10SNU . Purple: Ve = 2SNU ,
Vα = Vβ = 10SNU . For all plots, we consider that there is no thermal noise between the
source and ηab. ηa = ηb = 0.3.
Alice’s and Bob’s respective signals, independently.
The yellow plot shows I(A : B|S) and D(B|A) when there is thermal noise in the
legal channels (so after ηab) and no source input. In this case, there is no secrecy (and no
discord) either. This shows the need for correlated noise, so before ηab. Indeed, the noises
in Alice’s and Bob’s channel are not correlated. Their actions merely degrades the signal
coming through η2 as demonstrated by the purple curve.
IV. CLOSING REMARKS
In this paper we have demonstrated, that any thermal source can be used for secure key
exchange even if that source is held by a third party. Alice and Bob only need verify that
the statistical properties of the source are consistent with a thermal source. Moreover we
have demonstrated throughout this paper that any noise suffered by the eavesdropper, be
it preparation noise or channel noise, will benefit the legal parties. Furthermore, we have
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FIG. 8: We compare the influence of various noises on the discord(right). The parameters
are the same as for I(A : B|S).
demonstrated this with I(A : B|S), not I(A : B). This is significant. Not only is the mutual
information between Alice and Bob positive, but the information they share independently
of Eve is positive, which is a much more restrictive condition.
Hanbury Brown and Twiss correlations can be preserved over astronomical distances and,
indeed the measurement of HBT correlations forms a core component of radio astronomy.
Microwave sources are particularly convenient, because the thermal component is so high.
Indeed existing infrastructure from mobile phone masts to satellites could all be used as
potential sources.
The ease of finding a source is counter balanced by the substantially reduced key rates
over other methods such as CVQKD [14] or BB84 protocols [15]. However, there are many
low level consumer applications that do not require frequent key updates or high volumes of
secret key. It is worth noting that the aim here is not to replace or displace other methods of
high speed key exchange, rather the aim is to find a protocol that would allow existing secure
key exchange using existing communication mechanisms. Indeed most modern communica-
tion systems rely on displaced thermal states (see for example [16]) and in a future paper
we will aim to demonstrate key exchange using data obtained from HBT measurements in
15
a communications system.
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